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Abstract
Nowadays Internet becomes the most used tool for the
ever increasing amount of various transactions between in-
stitutions, organizations and more generally between clients
and providers. Conducted studies and experiments showed
that it is more convenient to provide and achieve these
transactions as web services (WS) to guarantee their flex-
ibility and their reuse. So far these services and the corre-
sponding providers’ URLs are advertised on specific UD-
DIs (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration). As
such, after finding the requested service any given client
contacts the right provider to negotiate the service ac-
cess procedure. These first contacts between clients and
providers are usually and commonly not protected (En-
crypted) yielding enough room for Hackers to intrude into
these unprotected messages.
In this paper, we propose a securing approach based on
both the PKI infrastructure and some proposed improve-
ments of the UDDI functioning in an attempt to provide ad-
equate security for web services.
1. Introduction
A web service (WS) can be any given transaction or a
function which achieves a specific task and can be accessed
commonly through a remote procedure call (RPC) via the
internet. Possibilities of composing dynamically several
WS to achieve some complex tasks are one of the attrac-
tive sides of such WS [6], [8]. Researchers are attracted
by such properties and started working on this field to sat-
isfy several needs especially that are related to the remote
cooperation and easy communication between geographi-
cally dispersed organizations and institutions [7]. The idea
consists to implement for example any given daily transac-
tion between any given organizations (a provider, clients)
in the form of a WS which can be accessed by any autho-
rized client just through a simple RPC. So far, WS are ad-
vertised over specific Directories named UDDI [15] where
any client can first looking for the appropriate WS and then
get the corresponding provider URL. After that, the client
has to contact the adequate provider to get the access grant
(which is a kind of certificate) to the requested WS. With
this access grant, the client becomes able to access to this
WS. Figure 1. illustrates the advertising mechanism of WS.
Unfortunately, WS security still constitutes the big chal-
lenge; in fact, despite the multitude of security proposals
done mainly by specialized consortium, organizations and
researchers such as W3C, OASIS [7], [1], [16], [10], [14],
[9], this problem seems to be not yet well solved. The
non possession of public key infrastructure (PKI) especially
by clients (customers) can be considered amongst the main
causes behind this security problem. As illustrated in figure
1. if the client doesn’t own a PKI, then any hacker can in-
terfere in the exchanged messages between this client and
the contacted provider and do what he wants.
Consequently, we, propose in this paper a detailed idea
based on both the PKI and the improvement of the UDDI
functioning which attempt to provide security for web ser-
vices. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In section 2, we overview the existing solution for secure
Figure 1. Web service advertising mechanism
WS then we discuss the limit of the existing architectural
scheme. In section 3, we present our contribution to provide
secure and safe WS. Finally in section 4, we summarize the
presented proposal and outline its perspective.
2. Background: Security of Web Services
Security of web services (WS) can be viewed from dif-
ferent sides because of the multitude of corresponding uti-
lization. If we consider the case of utilization of WS for
sharing information and services across organizations, then
we can say that the corresponding security proposals and
solutions are not bad but still require more improvements.
But if we consider the case of public WS which can be pro-
vided to any given client by specialized providers then, we
can say that the existing proposals and solutions lack a lot
of security. This is mainly due to the non possession of the
adequate security tools by most of the clients as we will ex-
plain next. Thus, our main concern in this paper focuses on
this last case.
Specialized consortium and organization such as W3C,
OASIS, ... have proposed several standards and solutions
which attempt to provide security for WS. The framework
illustrated by figure 2. is the most commonly used one to
provide security for WS. This framework shows that the se-
curity problem is divided into two levels; the transport level
and the application level.
2.1. Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS):
Commonly, SSL/TLS [5] offers a secure channel on the
transport channel. The server authentication is based on
specific certificates and the client is authenticated via pass-
word or certificates.
Figure 2. WS Security framework
2.2. Web Services Security (WS-Security):
If we assume malicious hosts then the transport level se-
curity is possibly not enough. The transport level is con-
trolled by the host, so the web service itself cannot verify
the user credentials. The industry standard WS-Security
[11] offers application level security as an extension to
SOAP [2]. It defines how to integrate various XML Secu-
rity concepts as XML Signature [4], XML Encryption [3]
or the Security Assertion Meta Language (SAML) [12] into
SOAP.
2.3. Security Assertion Meta Language (SAML):
SAML defines a XML-based framework for creating and
exchanging authentication and authorization information.
The standard purpose of using SAML is to realize Web
Single-Sign-On. The user authenticates at the first site, re-
trieves an authentication and authorization token and sub-
sequently uses this token to access further services without
the need of re-authentication.
2.4. XML Access Control Specifications XACML:
XACML [13] is an extension to SAML that focuses on
access control rights. XACML defines how to express ac-
cess policies. Furthermore it specifies a request/response
protocol between a policy decision and a policy enforce-
ment point. XACML is considered the better way to imple-
ment role based access control (RBAC) [7] which restricts
the WS accessibility according to predefined security poli-
cies and rules.
Unfortunately, despite the consistency and the robust-
ness of these security tools, WS still require more protec-
tion especially if they are intended for the public as we will
explain in the next subsection.
2.5. Limit of the existing architectural schema
So far, WS and the corresponding URL (of providers)
are advertised over specific UDDI where users (clients) can
look for then find the required services for their different
needs as illustrated in figure 1. The first security problem
that maybe encountered with this scheme concerns mainly
the first contact between any given client which belongs to
the great public and the provider. This contact can’t be pro-
tected (encrypted) especially if this clients don’t know the
PKI of the provider and in addition he don’t own a personal
PKI. Consequently, any hacker can easily interfere in ex-
changed messages between this client and provider to do
what he wants. To deal with this problem, we propose in
the next section an idea based on two components that at-
tempts to solve this limitation.
3. PKI and UDDI based trust center for secure
WS
Our proposal requires first the possession of a personal
PKI by every involved actor (a client or a provider) to en-
crypt all exchanged messages between them. Second, we
suggest that the UDDI should achieve in addition to its ac-
tual missions the following roles:
• a prior registration of any provider or client of the ad-
vertised WS;
• the publication in an encrypted manner of the PKI of
every party or actor (a client or a provider);
• the authentication of every party before any given ac-
cess to the advertised WS.
In this manner, UDDI will play indeed the role of a trust
centre and all exchanged messages between any given
provider and client will be well protected.
3.1. The mechanism of the proposed solution
As mentioned earlier , every provider or client of the ad-
vertised WS must be previously subscribed on the UDDI
server to guarantee the security of any given transaction be-
tween them. We suppose also that the UDDI server owns a
personal PKI which allows it to communicate in a secured
manner with every involved actor. Thus, if a given new
provider would like to advertise any WS, he must achieve
the following steps:
• register his complete identity which will serve to the
authentication process over the UDDI centre;
• advertise both his PKI and the WS which can provide
over the UDDI;
Figure 3. The mechanism of the proposed so-
lution
in the same manner if a given new client would like to ac-
cess (consume) any advertised WS, he must achieve the fol-
lowing steps:
• register his complete identity which will serve to the
authentication process over the UDDI centre;
• advertise his PKI over the UDDI;
of course, to reduce the involvement of the UDDI centre
during the authentication process and consequently the re-
sponse time of our proposal, we suggest that only the first
transaction or contact between any given provider and a
new client which requires this involvement. It means that
once a new client (customer) becomes known by any given
provider, then he will be added automatically to a list of
known customers with the corresponding PKI. So we sug-
gest that every provider must own a list of customers where
to store the required information to the authentication pro-
cess of each of which and the corresponding PKI to encrypt
every exchanged message with them. In this manner, hack-
ers will not be able to interfere in exchanged messages.
Figure 3. illustrates the mechanism of the proposed so-
lution; the corresponding steps are the following:
1. Looking for the required WS;
2. Request of registration and the personal public Key in
an encrypted message using the public key of the Trust
centre;
3. Registration + publication of his personal public key in
an encrypted message using the public key of the Trust
centre;
4. Getting the provider Public key and the adequate infor-
mation for the authentication process in an encrypted
message using the public key of the client;
5. Request of the required WS in an encrypted message
by using the provider public key:
6. Authentication of the client from within the list of al-
ready known customers;
7. If the client is a new one then the provider authenti-
cates him from the Trust centre in an encrypted mes-
sage using the public key of the Trust centre;
8. The trust centre authenticates the client and turns back
to the provider the adequate information of the client
in an encrypted message using the public key of the
provider;
9. After the authentication process, the provider updates
his customers list and turns back to the client the re-
quested WS in an encrypted message using the public
key of this client.
Consequently, the proposed solution improves substantially
the security of WS especially if these services are intended
for the big public.
4. Conclusion
We proposed in this paper a new solution that attempt
to improve the security of web services especially those in-
tended for the big public. Our proposal is based on two
components; the first one is the personal PKI which is re-
quired by every client or provider of WS. And the second
one is some improvements of the UDDI functioning which
should play the role of a trust centre in an attempt to provide
adequate security for web services. What makes attractive
our proposal is its easy adaptation to improve the security
of any kind of distributed application intended especially for
the big public such as e-health, e-learning, e-government ...
Several investigations are understudy, especially the im-
plementation and the real evaluation of our proposal on a
specific application.
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